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HIV Antibody Performance and
Testing: Counseling issues
Michael Gross, Ph.D.
This article assesses the performance ofcurrently used testsfor exposure to human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV), the infectious agent associated with acquired immunodefi-
ciency syndrome (AIDS); suggests, in view ofthat information, guidelinesfor counseling
people seeking HIVantibody testing; and evaluates the claim that because antibody test
results will effect behavior change in those who are infected, all members ofhigh-risk
groups should be tested.
HIV testing is likely to yield a high proportion offalse-positive results in low-riskpopu-
lations and infants born to infected mothers. A negative result may not establishfreedom
from infection in high-risk groups or the offspring ofinfected mothers. Counseling should
relate these generalizations to a client 's motivationfor and expectationsfrom testing. In
evaluating a client's risk ofexposure, past andpresent, counseling shouldprovide both
information about and reinforcementfor behavioral risk reduction.
The assertion that members ofhigh-risk groups ought to learn their antibody status is
questioned in view ofconcerns about testperformance and even more serious questions
about the psychological impact oftest results — both short- and long-term — on people 's
adaptation to protective sex and modification ofdrug use patterns.
In November 1983
— not long after scientists had concluded that AIDS was caused by a
transmissible agent and months before the disease was definitively associated with a
new virus — the New York Academy of Medicine published a comprehensive summary of
the state of knowledge about the syndrome. In the book's more than six hundred pages,
containing dozens of papers about AIDS, just three index entries on blood screening refer
to two short papers attempting to measure the efficacy of requesting that prospective
donors who are at risk defer themselves. In current AIDS compendia, in contrast, tech-
niques, applications, and interpretations of testing occupy whole chapters.
From a technical interest— how best to screen donations of blood and tissue for the
agent associated with AIDS — testing has evolved into a major area of biomedical re-
search and an even larger preoccupation, sometimes a battleground, of public policy.
Dr. Michael Gross coordinates support servicesforpersons who are HIV-antibody-positivefor the Massachu-
setts Department ofPublic Health. He also serves as a Support Service (hospice) volunteer with the AIDS Action
Committee ofMassachusetts , in Boston.
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Should some or all citizens be subjected to mandatory testing? Is testing appropriate for
purposes of insurance underwriting? Is testing a productive adjunct to risk-reduction
education and counseling efforts? Are there any occupations for which screening is neces-
sary to prevent transmission in the workplace? Are there valid reasons for testing institu-
tionalized populations?
Test Methods and Performance
An important consideration in determining valid uses of testing is the performance of
currently available methods. This section, therefore, examines the methods, accuracy, and
efficacy of current procedures and the possible meanings of test results. The next section
considers the implications of that information in an individual's decision about whether to
elect for HIV testing, and in relation to his or her adherence to risk-reduction guidelines.
Some of the patterns of response by individuals to their test results are then described as a
context for a discussion in the following section of principles that ought to underly the
adoption of testing programs. 1
Is There a TestforAIDS?
The so-called AIDS test does not diagnose AIDS. An AIDS diagnosis requires actual
illness, typically infections or cancers that indicate severe immune system damage. Even
in the presence of such indicators (opportunistic infections like Pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia or toxoplasmosis and cancers such as Kaposi's sarcoma or non-Hodgkins
lymphoma), other possible causes of immune suppression must first be ruled out, includ-
ing the use of immune suppressive or steroidal drugs or primary cancers that are them-
selves immune suppressive. 2
Direct evidence for HIV infection would result from detecting the virus itself. Such
methods, however, are used mainly for purposes of laboratory investigation. 3 Detection of
an immune response to the virus, in the form of antibody to the virus, is the most widely
used form of testing for such purposes as blood screening. But the mere presence of anti-
body to HIV does not establish an AIDS diagnosis, nor does it foretell with certainty the
onset of HIV-related illness in the future; moreover, early detection of HIV does not lead
to prevention of subsequent symptoms. 4
Why Use Antibody Tests?
In general, the presence of antibody is a more consistent indicator of present or past infec-
tion than the presence of the disease-causing pathogen itself. Antibody will remain long
after the causative agent of an infection has been cleared from the body. Before much
became known about the natural history of HIV infection, it seemed possible that, like
many other viruses, HIV might be eliminated by some individuals' immune response.
Antibody would then be the only trace of past infection or of ongoing infection with unde-
tectably low levels of virus. It now seems that most or all individuals infected with HIV
never successfully eliminate the virus altogether. But in its latent state, the virus would be
undetectable by antigen tests and possibly difficult to recover by viral isolation methods.
Therefore, an antibody test is the most consistent index of HIV infection available which
is practical to use on a large scale for screening purposes.
Why Use the ELISA Technique?
The most widely used screening method, employing an enzyme-linked immunosorbent
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assay (ELISA or EIA), is relatively inexpensive (typically, less than $5 per test for the cost
of reagents and equipment), highly reproducible, and technologically adapted for proc-
essing large batches of samples with efficient, automated laboratory apparatus. In con-
trast, other procedures (for example, viral isolation, Western blot) have technical limita-
tions. They usually depend on the competence, consistency, and particular recipes em-
ployed in a given laboratory5 and are correspondingly more expensive. They may entail
procedures that require special handling (for example, the radioactive reagents used in
DNA probe studies and radioimmune precipitation). They also may be more difficult to
interpret: for instance, both viral isolation and antigen tests frequently fail to detect virus
in samples from truly infected individuals. 6
What Are Current Proceduresfor Testing?
The protocol used by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health in its testing and
counseling programs, and by the American Red Cross New England Region Blood Serv-
ice screening program described here, is typical of testing programs across the country
and internationally. 7
Evaluation of a sample begins with an ELISA test. If the reactivity of the sample falls
below a predetermined cutoff value standardized for the particular test kit being used, the
result is judged negative, that is, no antibody detected. No further testing is undertaken. If
the observed reactivity is above the cutoff value, the same sample is tested again using the
ELISA procedure. When reactivity registers below the cutoff value on repeat testing —
not an unusual occurrence for samples from low-risk individuals — the sample is inter-
preted as negative.
If the repeat ELISA test is also reactive or borderline, the sample is subjected to a more
specific procedure that ordinarily has the capability to distinguish antibody to HIV from
antibody to something else. The immunoblot, or Western blot, can show whether the
antibody detected by ELISA binds to known classes of viral protein. The distinctive band-
ing pattern that appears when the HIV antibody is present confirms a positive ELISA
result. The lack of such a pattern indicates that antibody detected by ELISA was probably
elicited by some agent other than HIV which happens spuriously to cross-react with bio-
logical material that was not eliminated when the test kit was prepared.
If the immunoblot pattern is ambiguous, for instance, if the observed bands are only
very faintly perceptible, still another procedure may be employed: the immunofluores-
cence assay. 8 Cells known to be infected with HIV, along with uninfected (control) cells,
are exposed to a serum sample and appropriate reagents. Infected cells will become
coated with a fluorescent dye if the serum sample being tested contains HIV antibody,
while uninfected control cells will show no label. Such a result is considered positive. If
neither infected nor uninfected cells become labeled, the sample is considered free of HIV
antibody. If both infected and uninfected cells become labeled, the meaning is ambiguous,
and the outcome described as "indeterminate." 9
How Accurate Are Antibody Test Results ?
We do not know definitively. ELISA test kits from commercial manufacturers score dif-
ferently on tests meant to standardize their performance. In 1986, five products ranged
from 98.3 to 100 percent in sensitivity, which measures a test's ability to detect infection
when it is present. They ranged from 99.2 to 99.8 percent in specificity, which indicates
how well a test discriminates true infection from absence of infection. 10 These small per-
centage changes make a big difference in the proportion of false positives, as discussed
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below. The most sensitive tests are the least specific. 11 Making comparisons is difficult,
because each manufacturer's tests were standardized using different test samples, and
performance varies from batch to batch, even from the same manufacturer. In a study of
ELISA performance in five hundred laboratories, thirty-five of approximately seven
thousand positive samples were labeled negative. The laboratories, it should be noted,
were voluntarily participating in these proficiency studies, and extra care may well have
been taken, since the study samples were so labeled. 12
Western blot tests are even more difficult to standardize or compare, because only one
commercial test has been licensed. Most laboratories that perform Western blot testing
use reagents they prepare with their own procedures, and they define the standards to be
used in judging whether results for a sample are categorized as positive, indeterminate, or
negative. 13 Ten of nineteen laboratories seeking U.S. Army contracts for Western blot
testing were rejected because they failed a test panel at least once. 14 Using panels of am-
biguous samples, the College of American Physicians found 12 to 15 percent of laborato-
ries labeling two of three reactive samples indeterminate by Western blot.
The comparative performance of immunofluorescence assays — another form of confir-
matory procedure— is even less well studied than that of Western blot tests.
Although specimens used in laboratory studies to standardize the performance of HIV
tests receive optimal treatment, in the real world samples may be abused. 15 No systematic
studies have been published which examine how much mistreatment of samples is permis-
sible before antibody testing may lead to inaccurate results, or whether error would be
more likely to be in the direction of false positives or false negatives.
Are There Many False Positives?
A "false positive" means that someone tests positive or shows reactivity on an antibody
test even though he or she is not really infected. Even with a very low rate of false-positive
test results, in a population of low-risk individuals a large proportion of those few results
which are positive will falsely label as infected someone who is free of HIV. 16 These resid-
ual positive results are likely to remain positive on subsequent tests. 17 If antibody is spuri-
ously cross-reacting with HIV, it is not likely to disappear spontaneously. Furthermore,
other confirmatory tests are not likely to clarify the situation. Neither viral isolation nor
antigen tests are ultimate arbiters. Failure to detect virus during viral isolation may be due
to very low levels of virus, rapid death of cells harvested for culture purposes, or other
sources of failure of that very exacting procedure. Failure to detect antigen may result
from a latent infection in which HIV is not actively replicating, since latent virus may not
be detected by antigen tests.
IfI Test Positive, What Are the Chances IAm Truly
Infected?
The likelihood that a positive result truly indicates infection is related both to the person's
level of risk and to the accuracy of the test or, customarily, combination of tests used. The
lower the risk, the more likely it is that a positive result is misleading; the greater the risk,
the more likely it is that a positive result is a true indicator. For instance, a female who
meets blood-donor eligibility criteria and who has tested positive has only a one in seven
chance of truly being infected even when the combined accuracy of ELISA and confirma-
tory test is as high as 99.95 percent. If the combined accuracy of the test drops to 99.50
percent, then the likelihood of true infection is 1 out of 50. 18 Conversely, for a sexually
active gay man in Los Angeles, New York, or San Francisco, or an intravenous (IV) drug
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user in Greater New York, chances are better than 99 out of TOO that a positive test result
accurately indicates HIV infection.
These data make sense if we consider a simple example of two hypothetical popula-
tions — one low-risk, one high-risk— of 1 ,000 people each. A variety of studies suggest
that roughly 1 of 1 ,000 members of the "general population" tested randomly in such
procedures as military screening or studies of serum samples from routine hospital ad-
missions will be found positive. 19 Gay men in such second-tier cities (with regard to infec-
tion rates) as Pittsburgh and Chicago have an infection rate of about 300 per 1 ,000. Sup-
pose a false-positive rate of 0. 1 percent, or 1 per 1,000, applied to each such group.
In the first case, the chances of obtaining a true and a false-positive outcome are equal
(1/1 ,000). Put another way, the chance that a positive test is a valid predictor of infection
is 50:50. 20 In the second example, the likelihood of true infection when a sample tests
positive is 300 times greater than the likelihood of a positive result arising from test error.
In other words, in a high-risk population, the predictive value of such a test is much
greater than in a low- or no-risk population.
How Long Does It Takefor Detectable Antibody to Form
After Exposure ?
The U.S. Public Health Service implies that when exposure leads to infection, three
months is a sufficiently long period for antibodies to develop to detectable levels. 21 But it
is not that simple, and the question is difficult to study. Estimates using animal models or
immune responses of humans to other viruses may be invalid. 22
Definitive information comes from the very few known cases of seroconversion after a
needle-stick accident or a blood transfusion. But these cases, involving direct inoculation
of a substantial quantity of blood, may occasion a different rate of antibody development
than the more typical routes of viral exposure through sexual contact or IV drug use (in
which injected blood droplets are highly diluted). Also, the speed of response may be
affected if IV use itself or concomitant infections have compromised the individual's
immune system.
Published literature documents a few dozen instances of seroconversion within a few
months after apparent sexual exposure in gay men. 23 But other examples24 show latency
periods prior to seroconversion among gay men of twenty-three, 25 thirty-four, 26 and thirty-
six months. 27 Some studies of IV drug users show intervals of nine, fourteen, and eighteen
months between apparent exposure and the development of detectable antibodies. 28 None
of these studies bears on the likely interval for seroconversion in low-risk or very low dose
exposures. 29 Also, the design and manufacture of particular test kits — for example, the
amount, species, and source of HIV protein selected— may affect their sensitivity. 30
Finally, viral infection and antibody response within the central nervous system—
detectable by studying cerebrospinal fluid— may not be apparent from studies of serum
antibody. 31 However, such a compartmentalization of infection and antibody response is
believed to occur only rarely.
Are There Many False Negatives?
We do not know. For instance, ELISA-negative sera are not routinely screened by other
procedures such as the Western blot, 32 even though when such studies are done they reveal
a rate of false negatives in the neighborhood of 1 percent or higher, 33 owing solely to prob-
lems in the consistency of test performance. The value of a single negative test result in
establishing freedom from infection with HIV among people with a history of high-risk
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behavior is questionable, since the sensitivity of the ELISA test is based on studies of low-
risk individuals.
34
In various situations, even the most sensitive test is ineffective, because the subject
being studied, although infected, does not or cannot produce detectable antibody. It is not
at all unusual, for instance, to find false-negative results in symptomatic HIV-infected
patients.
35 In one study of "high-risk" gay men36 (more likely to be infected than the gen-
eral gay male population), four of the ninety-six patients studied harbored virus despite
persistent negative results on antibody tests. 37 In another research report, two of sixty-six
high-risk gay men were found to harbor virus even though their serum did not reveal
antibody. 38 Because viral isolation procedures and antigen tests do not always identify true
infection, 39 these results may, if anything, underestimate the rate of false negatives. In
another series, 8 percent of healthy infected gay men were negative by ELISA, but their
infection was detected by Western blot, which would not ordinarily be performed on
ELISA-negative specimens. 40 This statistic is consistent with theoretical estimates of 7
percent based on current test accuracy and typical infection rates for a city like Boston. 41
An example indicates why negative test results may be problematic. In one 1985 study, 42
a healthy twenty-four-year-old gay man was evaluated who had had 250 lifetime sexual
partners but fewer than 10 since 1981 . He had been receptive during anal intercourse only
with 4 partners, and his last oral or anal exposure to ejaculate had occurred four years
before the study. His only symptoms were swollen glands in his neck and recurrences of
herpes. During the two years prior to the study, he had become consistent in the practice
of "safer sex" and was clinically healthy. A series of antibody test results were negative.
In view of the interval since his period of greatest risk, his adherence to protective sex
guidelines, his current health, and the pattern of repeatedly negative antibody test results,
even very cautious counsel would affirm that very probably he was not infected. However,
upon further study, his serum was found to contain evidence of HIV even though no anti-
body was detectable.
WhatAbout Testing Newborns and Infants?
False-positive results are likely during the first year or so of life in an uninfected child
born to an HIV-infected mother. False negatives are not unusual, at one to two years old,
if the child was infected pre- or perinatally.
During the first year or more after an infant is born to an infected mother, her HIV
antibody, which was transferred across the placenta, may remain detectable in the baby's
circulation.
43 There is, during that interval, no routine way to determine whether antibody
to HIV detected in such a baby's serum derives from passive transfer of maternal antibody
or from an active response to HIV infection by the infant's immune system. Positive
results, in short, may well be misleading.
As the baby's immune system develops and maternal antibody disappears, the child
may fail to mount an antibody response to HIV if he or she has been infected since birth. 44
The baby's immune system may not react to HIV that has been present during its entire
life in the same way as it reacts to a foreign substance; consequently, there may be no
immune response — no HIV antibody — even though the child is infected.
Does Presence ofAntibody Prove Infectiousness?
Once infected, an individual probably remains infected. But an infected individual may
not be producing enough virus at all times to be able to transmit it to others. Since there is
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no way to know when one is highly infectious and when one is not, consistent use of risk-
reduction techniques is essential for people who are HIV-positive and for anyone else who
may have been exposed but who does not know his or her antibody status.
Attempts to isolate HIV from blood of antibody-positive individuals succeed about 75
percent of the time. 45 Because viral isolation is a difficult procedure, this statistic suggests
that virus is present in any individual who shows HIV antibody reactivity, even though
virus may not be recoverable from a particular specimen. On the other hand, antigen
tests, which show the presence of active virus or viral fragments in the specimen being
tested, may be positive in only a small fraction of individuals who display antibody reac-
tivity.
46
Another indirect source of data is epidemiological: Do individuals with positive anti-
body tests infect steady sexual partners when they do not follow protective sex guidelines?
They do, sometimes after only a single exposure. On the other hand, about half of the
steady male partners of infected men may not be infected even though the uninfected
partner may have been receptive during anal intercourse with the infected partner on
hundreds of occasions. 47 The same pattern occurs in heterosexual partners, with consider-
able variance from study to study. 48 In a recent study of heterosexual partners of people
unknowingly infected by blood transfusions, 92 percent of male and 82 percent of female
sexual partners — with an average, respectively, of 180 and 156 unprotected sexual con-
tacts — escaped infection. 49 A pattern of steadily increasing risk to the uninfected partner
is suggested by research on the female partners of hemophiliacs (70 to 90 percent of
whom are believed to be infected as a result of having received contaminated blood prod-
uct concentrates prior to the introduction of screening programs and heat-treatment proc-
esses). Studies of these women suggest that the likelihood of infection with HIV during
unprotected sexual contact increases with the length of time the infected individual has
carried the virus. 50 There are two possible explanations. As more contacts occur, perhaps
the chances become greater that whatever combination of factors is required for transmis-
sion is present. Or, as time passes, people who carry HIV may become more infectious,
perhaps because their health deteriorates to the extent that they begin to produce larger
quantities of virus than their immune system can inactivate.
Counseling Issues
Counseling individuals seeking HIV antibody testing can accomplish two important ob-
jectives: 51 (1) individualized assessment of risk and delivery of tailored, specific, focused
risk-reduction information; (2) assurance of fully informed consent prior to testing. In-
formed consent implies an assessment of whether the test can address the client's motives
for testing as well as an evaluation of whether the individual feels capable of managing the
test outcome, whatever it is. The question of motivation forms the starting point for the




Why is the individual seeking testing now? What triggered the decision to
have the test performed?
2. How accurate is the individual's understanding of the meaning of the test
in relation to his or her concerns?
195
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3. How will test results be used? What will be the behavioral and emotional
outcomes?
4. Is there a clear understanding of AIDS risk-reduction guidelines?
Why Seek Testing Now?
Much can be learned by finding out not only why an individual has concluded that testing
is worthwhile, but, more specifically, what immediate concern prompted the decision.
Responses to that question may reveal specifically relevant circumstances in the person's
life, and ways in which the person might use test results both profitably and harmfully.
Some typical triggering motives include the following:
• Coercion or insistence from a partner that one be tested. (Is the partner also
seeking testing? Are there issues of guilt, responsibility, power, or moral
superiority underlying this pressure? Would the person seeking the test
persist in seeking it without such pressure?)
• Concern about symptoms. (Has the individual consulted a physician? Can
some concerns be discounted as unrelated to HIV? Will negative results
cause the condition to remain untreated? Will a positive test result lead to
inappropriate self-diagnosis, failure to seek medical attention, or suicide?)
• Recent notification that one has been exposed from a past partner who has
tested positive or who has received a diagnosis of AIDS or AIDS-related
complex (ARC). (How does this new information change anything if the
individual already follows risk-reduction guidelines? If the motivation for
testing is to allay anxiety that has suddenly escalated, will a negative result
accomplish that? Is testing motivated by the wish that a negative result will
allay guilt on the part of the infected contact?)
• Recent sexual assault, after which the individual wants to establish a "base-
line" antibody status, showing that as of the time of the assault, she or he
was not infected; or a past assault, as a result of which the individual wants
to be sure she or he was not infected by the attacker. (Does the assault sur-
vivor understand that a baseline negative result shortly after the assault may
not be definitive [since any other possible exposure in the months before
the assault could also account for the development of a positive result in the
months after the assault]? If the test is to be used in prosecuting the at-
tacker, has a lawyer been consulted for advice about the kind of evidence
and testimony that will be required to pursue such redress? Will the testing
procedure itself impede the process of counseling and recovery in the
weeks and months following the assault? Is the testing procedure timed in
such a way that the individual will have a strong support system should the
result prove positive? How will test results affect the individual's motiva-
tion to practice safer sex?)52
• Pressure from a parent or a guardian. (Does the individual's behavioral
history agree with the perception of those who are applying pressure for
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testing? Is the individual being tested able to distinguish his or her own best
interests from the demands of those attempting to pressure him or her?)
• A specific news item or media report about AIDS. (Does the individual
have an accurate understanding of the information and its context? [For
instance, reports speculating about unusual or unproven modes of transmis-
sion need to be labeled as such.] Are there genuine risks that the individual
has not recognized which should lead him or her to adopt risk-reduction
guidelines?)
Does the Individual Understand the Meaning ofthe Test?
Prior to the advent of AIDS, the technical content involved in counseling — even in com-
plex decisions regarding prenatal diagnostic procedures and outcomes — was relatively
straightforward and unchanging, so that attention could be devoted to the ethical and psy-
chological issues involved. With AIDS, the relevant technical information is not only
complex and difficult, but also incomplete on many key points, and rapidly evolving. At a
minimum, anyone contemplating HIV testing needs to understand the following:
• A positive test result does not mean that the individual has AIDS or neces-
sarily will develop AIDS.
• By itself, a positive test result in an individual with medical symptoms does
not explain the cause of these symptoms.
• A positive test result means that the individual should consider him- or
herself able to transmit HIV to others sexually, through sharing injection
equipment (for any purpose, not just the use of recreational drugs, and
regardless of whether the skin is punctured intramuscularly or intrave-
nously); during pregnancy; at delivery; and possibly through breast-feeding.
• A negative result does not necessarily prove that an individual is free of
infection. Its meaning depends on how long a time has passed since the
most recent possible incidence of exposure; even with the passage of well
over a year since such an incidence, there remain some false negative
results, particularly, it is assumed, among individuals at high risk.
• A positive result may not be an accurate indicator of infection in individuals
with very little or no identifiable risk of exposure; there may be no ultimate
standard or measure to which to appeal except monitoring one's medical
status for possible HIV-related developments, while scrupulously following
risk-reduction guidelines.
What Will Be the Impact of Test Results ?
Not enough information is yet available about the specific personality profile or psycho-
logical determinants that characterize people who respond well or poorly to HIV testing.
Many, if not most, people who seek voluntary testing assume that they will test negative
and are thus hoping for reassurance that they are not infected. Often they have not consid-
ered realistically the ways in which a positive result might affect them. Many people who
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are in ongoing counseling or psychotherapy never mention their concerns about AIDS or
their interest in HIV testing to their therapist. And if they do, their counselor may have
encouraged them to be tested, secure in the belief that the test would reduce the client's
anxiety, without ever having examined with the client the possible impact of a positive
result. Certainly, the test is specifically contraindicated by a risk of suicide, homicide, or
other sociopathic behavior; risk of abandoning drug treatment; or other probable adverse
outcomes.
In the absence of risk of those specific adverse outcomes, it is important to try to ascer-
tain whether the individual's behavior will be any different if he or she tests positive than
if he or she tests negative. If an individual feels that he or she may be infected, risk-reduc-
tion guidelines may be appropriate whether or not she or he is tested, and whether the test
is positive or negative. Using test results to make career choices or financial plans may be
inappropriate, since the test is an uncertain predictor of actual illness.
If a woman or a couple is using the test to help make a decision about becoming preg-
nant or terminating a pregnancy, even with a positive result the best choice is not a fore-
gone conclusion. As with any other application of the test, results must be evaluated in
relation to one's history of risk. And even if a mother is truly infected, it is by no means
certain that her infant will become infected; the prevailing estimate— that about 50 per-
cent of infants born to infected mothers are also infected— averages statistics from spe-
cific studies whose estimates range from about 20 percent to as high as 80 percent.
Finally, just as women may reasonably choose to bear a child knowing that it may be born
with Down's syndrome, hemophilia, or Tay-Sachs disease or that it may develop Hun-
tington's chorea, so a parent or parents may determine that the risk is acceptable of giving
birth to a child that may or may not be infected and, if infected, may or may not proceed
to develop AIDS.
When a principal motive for testing is reduction of anxiety, the individual must consider
whether a positive outcome would greatly exacerbate his or her anxiety and whether some
uncertainty actually is preferable. For an individual at very low or no risk, a positive
result is unlikely and, should it occur, may be misleading because it may well be a false
positive. When the risk of obtaining a false positive is about equal to the risk of actual
infection (for example, for people who were transfused with one or two units of blood in a
low-risk area prior to the introduction of routine blood screening in the spring of 1985),
the decision about whether to proceed with testing is a difficult judgment to make.
Experience with repeat and chronic test-takers suggests that although people may ex-
pect test results to allay anxiety, for many people they do not. Sometimes people seize
(appropriately or not) on the ambiguities inherent in a negative result and seek repeat
testing even though no amount of testing will finally dissipate their anxiety. Some people
who test negative and appear at first to be greatly relieved that they have been spared may
find, with the passage of time, that they are less able to maintain risk-reduction behavior.
They repeatedly put themselves at risk, and chronically reappear for testing as a way to
"monitor" whether they have gotten infected yet.
When people seek testing as a license to abandon risk-reduction precautions, they fail
to recognize that it becomes more and more likely as time goes on that each new partner
will be infected. The need will become progressively greater to adopt safer sex techniques
and to be sure that if drug injection equipment is used it is sterile. Although the test may
allay worries about the past, for most people the greater challenge looms in the future:
developing and stabilizing habits that provide continuing protection from the possibility of
infection. The apparent clarity of a positive or a negative result may obscure the daunting
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but necessary effort to adapt to a changing environment in which safer sex must become
the norm.
Does the Individual Understand and Follow
Risk-Reduction Guidelines?
Few situations illustrate better than the AIDS epidemic that individuals do not fit into
simple, unitary categories. Actual behaviors are more important than self-designated
identity in evaluating someone's risk of exposure and, more important, in delivering risk-
reduction information. A gay man who always preferred very safe sex practices may
nevertheless have had an accident or illness that required multiple blood transfusions
before screening was introduced. Some men with hemophilia are gay, and some gay men
with hemophilia inject recreational drugs and share needles. Loving husbands and de-
voted fathers may sustain long-term partnerships with other men in a similar situation
without defining themselves as "gay," "homosexual," or even "bisexual." Former in-
travenous drug users who have been clean for months or years may continue to have sex-
ual relationships primarily with other ex-users or current users. Lesbians sometimes want
a gay male friend to father a child. Some heterosexual women like anal intercourse.
Heavy drinkers who black out may forget not only what kind of sex they engaged in but
also the gender of their partner. It matters when and where risky behavior occurred. For
instance, unprotected heterosexual intercourse with a man with hemophilia living in Pitts-
burgh may be much more risky than with an IV drug user in Ottawa.
Risk-reduction recipes sound simple in principle. Needle sterilization seems as easy as
rinsing out a drinking glass, and lists that assort safe, possibly safe, and unsafe sex acts
appear perfectly straightforward. But when people nod their heads and say, "I under-
stand," they may be suffering under significant misconceptions, or may be finding them-
selves unable to talk about how hard it is to put those simple guidelines into practice.
The phrase "exchange of bodily fluids" euphemistically avoids key particulars. Saliva,
sweat, and tears are far less menacing than blood or semen. "Exchange," which sounds
like a bank transaction, offers little clarification about how HIV may actually infect.
When the phrase "direct blood contact" is employed to clarify "exchange," it may mis-
lead, because the important blood cells in HIV infection are white, not red. The white
blood cells that HIV attacks may be present at any site of infection and inflammation, as
well as locations where blood vessels are actually ruptured or penetrated.
Since the beginning of the AIDS epidemic, "promiscuity" has recurrently been cited as
a key factor in HIV transmission. But an emphasis on number of partners may belie the
obvious: that a mutually monogamous, unprotected sexual relationship with an infected
partner is much riskier than scrupulously safe sex with a multiplicity of strangers. Gay
men in monogamous relationships seem less likely to be consistent about risk-reduction
guidelines than men who have nonsteady partners. 53 For instance, an important reason
why some gay men in San Francisco continued receptive anal intercourse was that they
accepted a single-minded public health emphasis on the dangers of promiscuity and
"anonymous partners" and believed that having fewer sexual partners would protect
them. 54 But statistical analysis suggests that even in 1982 the spread of HIV in that city was
such that a 50 percent reduction in the number of partners per year with no change in
actual sexual practices would have reduced the likelihood of exposure by only about 10
percent. 55
Not all sexual contacts are consensual. Even in less coercive settings than sexual as-
sault, the obstacles to adopting protective sexual practices may not be informational, but
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situational: a woman with young children whose sole source of financial support is an
abusive husband who has multiple sexual partners or a pattern of chronic needle sharing
during IV drug use, or both; a family, religion, and culture that tell this woman that her
fulfillment in life requires that she accede to her partner's demands; a man who obtains
sexual release only after drinking so much that he cannot remember whom he has slept
with or what kinds of sex he had; anyone who agrees that the measure of their love and
devotion or the guarantor of monogamy in a relationship is their willingness to have un-
protected sex; a sex worker (someone who is paid for sex) whose client will pay a much
higher fee if he does not have to use a condom.
What Are the First Reactions When People Learn Their
Test Results?
People usually react to the news of a negative result the way one would expect— with
considerable relief. Surprisingly often, however, some respond with indifference, and
occasionally, with almost a sense of letdown. 56 People who learn that their test was posi-
tive display a wider range of immediate responses, including outbursts of strong feeling,
especially sorrow and anger; withdrawal; stoic acceptance; a jumble of questions and
thoughts; and intellectualizing (for example, "It's what I expected," "Now I'll do what-
ever I have to do to keep from getting sick"). It has been suggested that for some, the
definitive information that one is infected may be calming because it reduces the anxiety
that results from uncertainty. I have observed this response on only a few occasions. Even
in the case of persons who appear most genuinely convinced that they have been infected
with HIV, a positive result dashes the optimism and hope that they seem to bring with
them to the test situation.
Over Time, How Do People Deal with Being
HIV-Antibody-Positive ?
People who have tested positive are divided about whether they ever should have had the
antibody test. Those who value it feel that it has been helpful in making decisions about
matters such as medical care, health maintenance, and financial planning; in setting prior-
ities; and in helping them to affirm the relative importance of various relationships with
lovers, family, and friends. They rarely, if ever, feel that testing has significantly changed
their commitment to protective sex— unless one views a change from consistently safe
sex to abstinence as a significant contributor to public health.
Those who regret having learned their status experience a wide range of problems. 57
Some persons who have tested positive describe, even years after learning their antibody
status, profound— sometimes omnipresent— feelings of foreboding, gloom, and im-
pending disaster. The resulting anxiety and depression may become self-perpetuating,
particularly when such feelings are interpreted as early signs of neurological damage due
to the progress of an HIV infection. In a support group I co-led for seropositive gay men,
the most guarded fear, which was verbalized only in the tenth week of a twelve-week
program, was the fear of literally losing one's mind to HIV infection.
Often there is tremendous uncertainty about how to deal with a medical situation that is
constantly changing. Optimistic news of an experimental treatment one day is juxtaposed
the next with reports of a gloomy prognosis for anyone who is infected. It is easy to collect
a portfolio of tales of insensitive, AIDS-phobic, homophobic, and drug-phobic providers
in medicine, dentistry, mental health, and alternative healing modalities. But even warm,
patient, trusted, sensitive providers have biases about the benefits and risks of specific
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treatments, whether conventional, experimental, or alternative. This diversity of opinion
may be healthy, but it imposes a burden that many medical consumers have neither the
training nor the temperament to bear. Gaining sufficient knowledge to make responsible
choices may become as consuming as a full-time career, and also may leave the affected
person with an overwhelming and inappropriate sense of responsibility for his or her own
medical fate.
People having difficulty with the knowledge that they tested positive describe struggle
and pain in their relationships. Friends sometimes withdraw, perhaps out of irrational fear
of exposure or anxieties triggered about their own situation. Or they may become oppres-
sively solicitous. The issue of disclosure may become a preoccupation. Does one tell
family members? Which ones, and when? Must or should one tell one's employer, and, if
so, when? Gay men liken the experience to "coming out," but without the sense ofjoyous
celebration that often accompanies acknowledging and beginning to experience one's
sexual identity.
Relationships may become problematic, especially if one's current sexual partner tests
negative or does not know his or her status. Does one inform any or all past sexual part-
ners or fellow drug users? What about the possible emotional fallout: blame, guilt, sor-
row, old wounds reopened? Does one tell a prospective sexual/emotional partner? Can a
relative stranger be trusted with this information after only a first encounter? What about
the pain of rejection if the news is shared only when the relationship has gained in close-
ness and significance? If the information is conveyed after a sexual encounter, even a
scrupulously safe one, how does that affect trust in the future, if the relationship survives
such a disclosure? If one decides to restrict sexual relations only to those who have also
tested positive, how does one meet them? If one chooses celibacy, how are needs for inter-
personal warmth, intimacy, and physical closeness to be met?
Policies for Testing
Testing is now one of the most popular items in AIDS budgets. Counting becomes con-
fused with controlling. 58 The principal reasons for this derive as much from emotion as
from reason. Everyone experiences a sense of urgency to do something, preferably some-
thing palpable, quick, easy, universally applicable, and mechanically predictable. The
uncharitable perception endures, usually with respect to groups other than those to which
authors of pro-testing recommendations belong, that "they" will change behavior only if
they are somehow shocked or flogged into it by the distress of a positive test result. 59 The
misconception persists among many policymakers that people who test negative need be
less worried about transmission that those who test positive. Testing also has the effect,
desirable to some, of diverting educational dollars into fiscal support of laboratories and
collection of epidemiological data. A mechanical procedure like drawing blood samples
and running them through a laboratory procedure seems somehow more hard-hitting,
objective, and productive than education, which seems soft— just a cozy little chat about
sex.
Does Knowing One *s Antibody Status Lead to Risk
Reduction?
Long-term reactions to learning one's antibody status remain poorly documented and
mostly anecdotal. This is important, because longitudinal studies of the factors important
in maintaining safer sex do not agree with cross-sectional studies. 60 Relatively few people
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have known their HIV antibody status for more than a year or two. Many of those who
have been studied are in individual therapy or support groups or research studies, all of
which select subjects who are in certain ways nonrepresentative. 61 Some clinical interven-
tions may select specifically for people experiencing difficulty managing this knowledge.
Others may attract those who already are coping very well. Besides knowledge of anti-
body status, usually all subjects in such studies are receiving some form of systematic
professional attention, educational interventions, and support as part of the research pro-
tocol.
What we do know is not especially encouraging. Some studies of short-term outcomes
do indeed suggest that people who learn they have tested positive reduce risky behavior to
a greater extent than people who have tested negative. 62 This is not as reassuring as it may
sound— assuming that the negative result is a valid indicator of freedom from infection—
since there remains the risk of future exposure. Other findings suggest that those who
learn they have tested negative may be less committed to adopting safer behavior than
those who do not learn their antibody status. 63 Although the U.S. Public Health Service
suggests that learning one's antibody status is "an important component of prevention
strategy" for individuals with a history of high-risk behavior, presumably because it will
motivate them to make a concerted effort to reduce risk, 64 the most methodologically
sound research studies to date suggest that, at least for gay men, other factors besides
knowledge of one's antibody status weigh more heavily in the consistent, sustained prac-
tice of safer sex. 65 Of great importance to these persons is the perception that they are
situated in a supportive peer community that holds shared values about the importance of
safer sex. Paradoxically, persons with the greatest sense of vulnerability to AIDS — such
as those who have tested positive— may have the greatest difficulty in adjusting to and
maintaining safer practices. 66 Individuals already having difficulty with impulse con-
trol — who have not integrated knowledge of risk reduction with behavior— may not
become more cautious upon learning they are infected with HIV. 67 This is consistent with
the observation that intravenous drug users who are in the early weeks of drug treatment
and who learn they are antibody-positive are more likely to drop out of such programs or
return to injecting drugs, or both, than if they learn they are antibody-negative or do not
learn their antibody status. 68 Anecdotally, people who have been in recovery from drug
addiction for a year or more have remarked to me that they doubt they could have handled
news of a positive antibody status during their first three to six drug-free months.
Should All Members of "High-Risk" Groups Be Tested?
Antibody screening has been recommended for all members of so-called high-risk groups
and is required of any captive or disenfranchised populations available to the federal and
various state governments, including immigrants seeking to become naturalized citizens;
prisoners; and military, Peace Corps, Vista, and all foreign service personnel. In a pio-
neering analysis of HIV antibody screening programs, 69 Bayer et al. have stipulated ethi-
cal principles and have located pragmatic grounds for rejecting mass screening for
hospital admissions (except perhaps in custodial institutions), marriage, prison, or the
workplace (except perhaps "prostitutes"). 70 Most public health officials concur, sharing
concerns about the accuracy and efficacy of tests, the relative costs in comparison with
other prevention interventions, and legal as well as ethical implications. 71
But, setting aside three basic principles that they propose— "respect for persons,"
"beneficence," and "justice" — Bayer et al. focus on a fourth, "the harm principle," and
deny that individuals at high risk should have "the right not to know" their antibody sta-
202
tus. They argue for use of the antibody test because "there is reason to doubt that advice
alone provides sufficient motivation" for "radical alterations in sexual conduct and in
childbearing plans. . . . Given the risks associated with AIDS and the uncertainty about
what will in fact modify high-risk behavior, there is a strong community interest in en-
couraging voluntary testing." The authors acknowledge, however, that "such information
may be so psychologically devastating that the individual will suffer greatly without any
benefits to himself or herself or additional benefits to others." 72
I believe their position is flawed for three reasons. First, the argument poses a false
dichotomy: we are not forced to choose between advice and testing. Another option must
be made available for anyone— aware of their antibody status or not— having difficulty
reducing high-risk behavior or in danger of relapse: sensitive, responsive, creative pro-
grams that support the process of achieving a satisfying adaptation to the requirements for
sexual risk reduction. 73 Second, why assume that when "advice" does not effect behav-
ioral change, "information" — in the form of knowledge of one's antibody status — will?
This is particularly problematic, for reasons given by Bayer et al. : "There is no way to
discern in advance which of the infected people will modify their behavior without notifi-
cation and which will not," 74 nor, I would add, is there a way to discern in advance which
persons, given notification, will modify their behavior in harmful ways.
Third, Bayer et al. institute a revealing double standard. For health care providers per-
forming invasive procedures, a risk of HIV transmission exists which is more than "only
theoretical," for instance, if an accident exposes the open wound of a patient to blood from
a health care worker. Health care personnel are advised to take "standard infection con-
trol precautions . . . whether or not they know their antibody status." 75 Such precautions
are futile for accidents in which blood is drawn— for example, when a blade slips and
cuts through single or double latex gloves. Why not here, too, accord priority to the harm
principle and argue forcibly for submission to voluntary testing by all health personnel
who perform invasive procedures? Why suppose that knowledge of one's antibody status
is an indispensable motivator for sexual risk reduction but has no bearing on scrupulous-
ness about infection control, no influence on the care taken to avoid accidents, and no
relevance to the desirability of voluntary job reassignment for HIV-infected health person-
nel performing invasive procedures? The point here is not to argue that health care work-
ers performing invasive procedures have no right to remain uninformed of their antibody
status, but rather to suggest that there is serious inequity in denying "the right not to
know" to conventionally defined high-risk groups while implicitly extending it to every-
one else. 76
How Should Testing Programs Be Evaluated?
To the ethical principles Bayer et al. propose in their analysis of screening programs, I
suggest adding two criteria for the evaluation of testing proposals: (1) that they are the
least intrusive way to accomplish a necessary goal, and (2) that they obey the fundamental
dictum of medicine to do no harm.
As an example of the first principle, the need for epidemiological data on rates of infec-
tion can be met without testing and labeling specific individuals as infected. Blind sam-
ples, coded by source (for example, inner-city vs. rural newborn infant blood samples
used in an ingenious study of childbearing women in Massachusetts77) can reveal a great
deal about infection rates in the general population, and voluntary testing programs as
well as noncoerced participation in research studies already have provided much informa-
tion, not only about overall rates of infection, but about the dynamics of HIV transmission.
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The second principle encapsulates the problem with widespread use of HIV testing as a
means of effecting behavior change: it is a psychologically invasive procedure of un-
proven benefit. Although no physically invasive procedure— chemotherapy, surgery, or
other medical treatment— is widely adopted without evaluating whether its anticipated
benefit equals or exceeds its risk, HIV testing has not been so stringently reviewed. Yet it
is sufficiently psychologically intrusive to have been the immediate precipitating factor
for some suicides. And it is experimental — of uncertain benefit and of unknown risk in
terms of long-term adverse psychological sequelae.
The cautious evaluation of drugs used to treat patients with AIDS models appropriate
care in evaluating unproven treatments. The medical profession weighs seriously the
physical harm done by a drug with dangerous side effects, even though human compas-
sion and the danger of imminent death both dictate the most expansive availability of any
promising therapeutic agent for AIDS. In contrast, advocates of testing programs may
cavalierly dismiss psychological morbidity. 78 They may never even mention that an evalua-
tion plan needs to be implemented for analyzing outcomes, and weighing their risks and
benefits.
79
Drug trials offer a valid paradigm for considering risky, unproven psychological inter-
ventions. Although Suramin was an effective antiviral agent in the test tube, it apparently
did more harm than good when employed on a small sample of people with AIDS: care-
ful, skeptical evaluation was essential to spare people from misuse of a drug that appeared
at first to be promising. When Azidothymidine (AZT, or zidovudine, or Retrovir) was
shown in the laboratory to be of apparent benefit in inhibiting the growth of HIV, it was
distributed widely to AIDS patients only after two phases of trials: one to identify whether
a dose existed that the human body could tolerate without irreversible harm, and a second
to establish whether treatment conferred any benefit. In that second phase, parallel dou-
ble-blind placebo-controlled studies enrolled patients from specific subgroups. 80 On the
basis of such studies, AZT currently is recommended only for persons with AIDS as
diagnosed by a history of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and for persons with helper T-
cell counts below a specified threshold. Without sufficient evidence of benefit for other
subgroups, AZT is not routinely recommended for all people with AIDS, much less all
people infected with HIV.
Compare that caution and specificity with the blanket recommendation that all individ-
uals in so-called high-risk groups seek voluntary HIV antibody testing, or with arguments
for even more widespread mandatory testing (sometimes euphemistically referred to as
"required" testing). We need to know how intravenous drug users react who are not in
treatment, who are in methadone programs, who are now drug-free, who are in Alco-
holics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, or other twelve-step recovery or self-help
programs, who are breadwinners for families, who are in shelters for the homeless or in
community housing, who are living alone, and so on. We need to know how gay men in
long-term monogamous relationships react to test results, compared to gay men who are
not, compared to married bisexual men. We need to know how test results affect gay men
still practicing high-risk sex with various partners, compared with gay men who are prac-
ticing high-risk sex only with long-term monogamous partners, compared with gay men
who routinely are essentially safe in sexual behavior. Hardly any information exists about
the specific psychological profile— in terms of such factors as locus of control, risk tak-
ing, capacity for intimacy, tolerance for ambiguity, self-esteem, and so on— of persons
likely to benefit from testing. And until such research is done, it is no more ethical to
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prescribe antibody testing for all members of high-risk groups than it would have been to
recommend AZT for everyone infected with HIV.
Public health policies that endorse widespread or "routine" testing may compound the
problems already experienced by health educators who deal with AIDS. A single example
may suffice. Mistrust of medical expertise already accounts for unyielding public concern
about AIDS transmission via casual contact. What will be the effect on public trust and
public policy of testing programs that falsely label half of those who test positive as in-
fected carriers of a lethal virus, while erroneously reassuring thousands of infected peo-
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2. Only in the most recent modification of the Centers for Disease Control surveillance definition of
AIDS has the "AIDS test" in certain circumstances become a necessary part of the differential
diagnosis of AIDS. It is employed where an individual with a history suggesting possible expo-
sure to HIV is severely ill — for instance, having lost 10 percent of body weight, with chronic
diarrhea or fatigue, or dementing — and no other specific explanation can be found other than
infection with HIV. "Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immunodefi-
ciency Syndrome," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (supplement) 36, no. 1 S, 14 August
1987.
3. Limitations of each of the principal methods for establishing the presence of the virus restrict
their usefulness for screening purposes.
a. Microscopy: If HIV is not actively reproducing and is instead in a latent state, it will not appear
under microscopic observation. Even if it is actively replicating, it still may be present in such a
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small proportion of cells that it will escape observation
b. Viral isolation: The growth of HIV from a tissue specimen or body fluid sample does prove that
the virus is present. But growing sufficient virus to be detected takes time, requires skill, and
often does not yield reproducible results. Thus, viral isolation may underestimate the presence of
virus in a truly infected specimen.
c. Antigen testing: If HIV is latent — incorporated in its "proviral" form into the DNA of an in-
fected cell — there will be no reactivity on an antigen test. Because antigen tests most accurately
measure active HIV infection, a principal use of antigen testing is to evaluate the effect of antiviral
agents on viral replication.
d. DNA probe (Southern blot; in situ hybridization): Fragments of viral DNA in the chromosome
can be detected by the binding of radioactively labeled or colorimetrically detectable probes
constructed of complementary DNA sequences. The proportion of chromosomal DNA in an
infected cell contributed by viral genes is very small, as is the proportion of cells actually infected
with HIV. Some method of amplifying the amount of viral DNA is necessary so that it can be
detected. Such a method has only recently been developed for laboratory use. See Jeffrey L. Fox,
"Monitoring and Diagnosis of HW" American Society for Microbiology News 53 (1987): 430. The
technical difficulty of handling radioactive materials makes this procedure costly and not now
widely applicable.
e. Indicator cell lines: This procedure depends on the conservation of special regulatory genes
and proteins among variant strains of HIV which are not found in other viruses. It is more compli-
cated than current antigen or antibody tests but would detect latent as well as active infection.
See Barbara K. Felber and George N. Pavlakis, "A Quantitative Bioassay for HIV-1 Based on Trans-
Activation," Science 239 (1988): 184-186.
205
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
4. Kenneth H. Mayer, "The Clinical Challenges of AIDS and HIV Infection," Law, Medicine and Health
Care 14 (1986): 281-289.
5. Commercial Western blot reagents manufactured by DuPont have been licensed during the past
year but cost more than laboratories spend preparing the equivalent materials using their own
procedures. Consequently, cost savings override the possible benefits of standardization, in
practice.
6. Kenneth H. Mayer et al., "Correlation of Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assays for Serum Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus Antigen and Antibodies to Recombinant Viral Proteins with Subse-
quent Clinical Outcomes in a Cohort of Asymptomatic Homosexual Men!' American Journal of
Medicine 83 (1987): 208-212.
7. "Update: Serologic Testing for Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus," Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report 36, no. 3 (8 January 1988): 833-845.
8. F. K. Mundon et al., "Analysis of Discrepant Anti-HIV ELISA Reactives," /// International Confer-
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thus far in voluntary screening programs in Massachusetts, another sample is usually requested.
If the ambiguity resulted from very low levels of antibody developing in the early stages of infec-
tion, a sample drawn four to eight weeks later should be plainly reactive. If the ambiguity resulted
from low levels of cross-reactive antibody first elicited by something other than HIV, the border-
line or ambiguous results would persist after such a time delay (workshop presentation by Victor
Berardi, Director of Virology, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, State Laboratory
Institute, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, 4 January 1988).
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make antibody to polystyrene, the plastic substrate used in several commercial ELISA test kits!
(Confirmatory Western blotting would rule out that source of reactivity as HIV-related, however.)
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"The PWA does have an integral role to play in this health
crisis. But government health agencies andpoliticians
,
especially the ones in power, tend not to take PWAs too seriously.
Many have never seen a PWA in their life; there may even be
people in this room who have never met a PWA in their life. We
tend to be a novelty act, and when that novelty wears off, the
doors may not open to us anymore. I don 't believe the
government has ever had to deal with patients ' organizations
like this before and they simply don 't know what to make ofus,
so they humor us. PWAs are not seriously consulted on decisions
that affect our lives and ourfreedoms. PWAs are always the last
to know anything about what the government is doing.
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The cause or source of a disease; in the case of AIDS, the
infectious virus.
Abnormal or depressed ability to maintain immunologic
integrity; especially, an inability to fight infection.
A protein capable of limiting superinfection; produced by
cells when infected with a virus.
A protein substance produced by white blood cells which
regulates the function of other white cells and intracellular
virus replication.
The prevalence and distribution of antibodies, reflecting the
degree and extent of infection of a population.
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